The Persian Government still hesitates to take the final, irretrievable step. It has brought itself to a point at which it faces the full consequences of a precipitate rush into nationalisation for which the country is in no way prepared.

The oil industry can be taken over if the Government presses its decision. It could, possibly, be kept working after a fashion even if the British employes were to be withdrawn. But, deprived of the vast overseas marketing organisation on which the industry depends, it would remain in Persian hands as a valueless asset.

Behind the Government's show of bravado it seems possible to detect an acute anxiety. It is significant, for example, that the National Oil Board has made no attempt to interfere with the operation of the Abadan refinery or to stop the loading of tankers. In fact, it has done no more than try to establish Persian ownership of the oil leaving the refinery.

This would be an encouraging sign of a more realistic outlook in Tehran if it were not contradicted by everything else the Government says and does. Negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are at an end; the British Government is not listened to, and Dr. Mossadeq keeps on repeating that he is not going to be influenced by anything the International Court of Justice may have to say.

To make matters still worse, the Prime Minister has appealed to the Majlis to bring down an anti-sabotage law obviously directed against the company’s British employes. This is not only a provocative act; it is also a most stupid one. The Government’s only sound hope of keeping the industry running lies in inducing the British employes to remain at their posts. For its part, the company is willing that they should remain provided it may itself have some say in the management of the new national concern. But the Government is now behaving in such a way as to make it doubly certain that if the company goes its employes will go with them. [Then what should they do to prevent sabotage?]

That may be the deliberate intention. Dr. Mossadeq has said that he would rather see the oil fields dry up than have them worked by foreign enterprise. Yet, even as he screws up his resolution to take the plunge, it is scarcely possible that he can shut out the thought of the ruin into which he is leading the country.