The danger in foreign policy in Great Britain is that it is ceasing to be foreign. It is becoming only too domestic. As an inevitable result, it is rapidly weakening in its foreign effectiveness.

The change for the worse became apparent with the illness and death of Ernest Bevin. It is true that Mr. Bevin had little experience in foreign affairs, and perhaps little aptitude. But he did have the strength to look reality in the face and to admit what he saw. He was indeed, as one observer said, a man “cut out of old English oak, with all the knots and gnarls.” He made his mistakes. But he had the massive virtue of trying to stand firm.

The active pressures of the Bevan group were not quite so open and strategic in Ernest Bevin’s day in the foreign office. [Aneurin Bevan] But it is hard to believe, were he alive today, that he would not turn his great bulk upon his internal critics and stand his ground. But “Old Ernie” is gone. And he has been succeeded by a compromise.

No one denies that Mr. Herbert Morrison is a man of great astuteness. [Foreign Minister] But this astuteness has for years been devoted to the art of adjusting party differences. The role of “party manager” is one clearly demanding high talents. But the British nation as a whole, and the broader alliance of western nations, has had the painful experience of seeing party strategy move into the foreign office.

It would be serious enough if internal party politics were to be allowed to bedevil British foreign policy. One of the worst features is that an aggressive and influential section of the Labor Party has been insisting that anti-Americanism should be one of the loudest orders of the day. So it is that the failures of British foreign policy, by being attributed to the United States, are being made a domestic issue.

There are cries of “restrain the wild men of Wall Street and Washington.” These cries do not come only from the Bevanian corner. They are now rippling over the party ranks. Britain, it is said, has been led by the nose. This is asserted as evident in Iran. It is because the Americans would not back Britain in a stronger stand against Premier Mossadegh that Britain has been forced into its humiliating withdrawal. In other words, the Americans expect Britain to back them up in Korea, but they won’t back up the British in the Middle East.

But this argument hardly holds. The two cases are different. Korea was a case of armed aggression by one nation upon another. Whatever the demerits of Premier Mossadegh, he is not invading an alien territory, he is a national leader engaged in a dispute with his concessionaire. Armed resistance was the only answer in Korea: negotiation is the only hope in Iran.

If the British are now retiring, it is not because they, wished to use armed force and were hamstrung by United States interference. No one believed (Premier Mossadegh least of all) that the British Government ever intended to use force. The show of strength was only a demonstration. The trouble is that Britain, with no alternative but negotiation, has negotiated badly, and in the end refused to negotiate at all. It turned from negotiations to ultimatums, without being really ready to back its ultimatums with force.

In this day on the international stage the United States is scarcely the villain. It could hardly have encouraged Britain to use a force that she would have been reluctant to use. It stood for negotiation, but found the British difficult as well as the Iranians. No doubt the United States failed. But it is not responsible for the larger failure.

Yet anti-Americanism is proving good fodder for the campaign guns. Whereas foreign policy should be directed most of all towards Anglo-American unity, it has now become a wide field for domestic gambling. And the gamble is that people might be led to believe that by expressing their anti-Americanism at the polls they will assure world peace and the success of British foreign policy. And as for Mr. Churchill, he’s “a warmonger.” And why a warmonger? Because he would place his emphasis on Anglo-American unity. [Winston Churchill]

No doubt all’s fair in political warfare. But a policy of representing Britain’s best friend as the cause of her worst fears and failures is a domestic type of foreign policy that is very foreign to the best in British tradition.