SUBJECT
       The Shah of Iran as a Nationalist

The Shah’s personal rule of Iran is probably more secure now than at any time since he succeeded to the throne in 1940, and a primary reason for this is his conscious avowal of nationalistic policies during the last six years. This paper examines the policies followed during that period and estimates the degree of success achieved by the Shah in his search for support for his program of “positive nationalism.”

Abstract

In 1962 the Shah formulated a six point reform program which has been broadened since then to twelve points, some of them very extensive in scope. These reforms define the Shah’s concept of “positive nationalism” and are intended to gain the support of Iranians for the Shah’s regime while cutting the ground from under any opposition groups which might seek support openly or clandestinely. The reforms are also intended to give the Shah the image of a modernizer in foreign countries. Although the reform program is by no means complete, it has already accomplished some of the goals the Shah set for it.

In Iran’s dealings with the Western oil Consortium, the Shah has cultivated the image of a nationalist hero fighting against foreign exploitation and has striven to succeed the late Mosadeq in that role. [Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Premier from 1951-1953] Since about 1962 Iran has gradually moved to downplay its ties with the West and to establish an independent foreign policy. The Shah has visited seven Communist countries in the last three years. This period has enabled the Shah to stress the benefits to Iran of his “positive nationalism“, and the coronation of October 1967 symbolized and highlighted his accomplishments. The coronation also demonstrated the Shah’s resolve to provide for continuation of the Pahlavi dynasty and played up the cultural heritage of Iran. The Shah’s determination to provide a strong defense in the Persian Gulf to back up Iran’s involvement in the area has been publicized as a national mission, and there is a danger that a serious oil dispute in the Gulf or a clash between Arab and Iranian residents of Bahrein (which Iran claims and which is to be a member of the prospective Federation of Arab Amirates) could prompt the Shah to involve Iranian forces to protect Iran’s national honor. [Bahrain]

Despite growing prosperity and dwindling opposition activity the Shah has not permitted Iranians to involve themselves in free political activity on an organized basis. The New Iran Party, established in 1963, soon lost its pretension of representative political activity and became simply a creature of the government in power. Opposition parties have been persecuted and in turn weakened by internal dissension over what reaction they should have made to the persecution. The Shah seems to have made a conscious decision to emphasize the pursuit of higher standards of living in order to keep Iranian minds off any movement to secure participation in the political process. If the current campaign against former Prime Minister Amini is any indication, political criticism may be subject to attack in the future as a threat to Iran’s material prosperity. [Ali Amini] Perhaps the Shah will allow limited political participation when he feels he has gained broad support of the people.

The Shah has been able to remove from his regime the stigma of being subservient to the West, and the opposition no longer has a monopoly on nationalism. There is little doubt that the Shah’s position has been strengthened. The greatest weaknesses of his regime are probably the continued rift between it and most intellectuals, and the fact that the government is highly personal, with the Shah in the central role. Removal of the Shah from political life would probably cause a major crisis and might seriously affect Iran’s stability.

[Here follows the body of the paper.] [Why wasn’t it included?]