United States Senate Hearings — May 1951
| The Mossadegh Project | March 31, 2026 |
Hearings by the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS
MacARTHUR FROM HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN THAT AREA
PART 2
MAY 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1951
General BRADLEY: [Omar Bradley] Korea is a poor place to fight a war, and a lot of military implications are involved in extending the war. Now if Russia should come into this war, it would
be very difficult to supply the troops in Korea or to get them out, and so speaking entirely from a military point of view, we do not want to take that risk.
Senator GEORGE: [Walter F. George Dem.-GA] I understood, General, but I said if we knew Russia was not coming in, there would be nothing wrong in us striking back at the concentration points
in Manchuria.
General BRADLEY: Yes; but who can tell us they won’t?
Senator GEORGE: Well, I can understand that, General. How can you tell us that we won’t get into war if we go into Iran tomorrow with the British and say that you must not take this oil or you must not nationalize?
We are taking chances, General, everywhere.
General BRADLEY: That is right.
Senator GEORGE: And that is all I am saying. I was asking you this simple question: That from a strictly, military point of view, with the assurance that Russia was not going to intervene directly, there was nothing wrong with
General MacArthur’s request that his planes be permitted to break up the concentrations across the Yalu River, troop concentrations that were coming down on his own troops. [Douglas A. MacArthur]
General BRADLEY: If you put in the condition, the assurance that Russia would not come into it, naturally the answer to your question is, “Yes, it would be a military advantage.”
Senator GEORGE: That is what I meant.
General BRADLEY: But no one can give us that assurance.
Senator GEORGE: I understand that, General. I am not insisting that anyone can give its that assurance.
CLARIFYING STATEMENT ON JCS AND IRAN
Mr. Chairman, may I correct something which may be a little bit wrong, in the record, from the last two questions; which I think ought to be straightened out before we start another period of questions?
Chairman RUSSEL.: If you wish, sir.
Senator BREWSTER: I think two points may not be clear, here; and it is my fear they will not be.
A double-barrelled question was asked me a while ago by Senator GEORGE: One involved going into Iran; and there was a second part of the question, to which I think I answered “yes.”
I don’t want it to stay in the record that I am saying the Joint Chiefs would advocate our going into Iran. I think that should be cleared for the record’s sake, and it was inadvertent on my part. I forgot that was part
of the question I later answered.
We have no commitment of going into Iran with the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff certainly have not made any such decision, and that ought to be cleared up.
CLARIFYING STATEMENT ON AVOIDING WAR
The second one—I made the statement, in answer to Senator Morse’s question about not going to war until we were better prepared. I stated by not going to war now and avoiding war now, we could avoid it for all time; and I want to
make it clear that my statement—we do not want to go to war until we are better prepared—really means that we hope to not go to war at all, but we don’t want to take any more chances than we have to.
Chairman RUSSELL: [Richard B. Russell, Jr., Dem-GA] All right, sir.
Senator SMITH: [H. Alexander Smith, Rep-NJ] General Bradley, are you familiar—
Senator SMITH: Would you mind if I interrupted for this observation?
If the general thought that was important enough, Mr. Chairman, to interrupt to correct his statement, I would think it would be wise for it to go to the press at once so that the addition will go at the same time as the original
statement.
If we could get another stenographer up here, so that it would be possible for it to be taken down right away, do you think there might to something in that?
Chairman RUSSELL: I think that is a very good suggestion.
Of course it doesn’t look like we are prepared to go to war anyway.
Senator BREWSTER: Mr. Chairman, I couldn’t hear very well. Do I understand he wanted to eliminate all reference—
Chairman RUSSELL: No; he didn’t want to eliminate it. He wanted to arrange to have the press get the statement General Bradley just made at the same time they got the one that could have been the subject of some confusion.
Senator BREWSTER: You don’t feel that it would be expedient to eliminate the whole thing?
Chairman RUSSELL: I didn’t understand that was proposed.
Senator BREWSTER: I am very reluctant to say we will or will not go into Iran.
I would like to leave the Russians a little in ignorance if possible.
If it could all be eliminated, I would think that best.
General BRADLEY: The point I was making was: I didn’t want to show, in the record, that we had made a decision to do it. We made no decision either way.
Senator McMAHON: [Brien McMahon, Dem-CT] Would it not be best, Mr. Chairman, to call down to the censors, to say that the general, in the light of his statement, now feels that that should
go out of the record?
Chairman RUSSELL: The only difficulty is, as I see it, the question was raised by Senator George, in his question; and it was a two-pronged question, as I recall it, and after the Senator said something about going into Iran
tomorrow, he went on to something else about Korea, and General Bradley answered the Korean part of the situation.
Senator BREWSTER: Has it gone to the press yet?
Chairman RUSSELL: I hardly think it has.
Senator BREWSTER: If it hasn’t gone, couldn’t it be treated as a security matter?
Chairman RUSSELL: I rather think Admiral Davis would handle that, which he has before. Will you look into that, General Mudge?
Senator SMITH: General Bradley, have you covered that? Are you satisfied you have got your position clear?
General BRADLEY: Yes, sir.
IRANIAN SITUATION
Senator BREWSTER: [Owen Brewster, Rep.-ME]
Now, to what extent are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if you feel free to state, giving consideration to the apparent imminence of trouble in Iran, as making more desirable the liquidation of our problem in Korea?
General BRADLEY: [Omar Bradley] Well, of course, the longer the problem in Korea keeps up, the less we are prepared to meet any movement anywhere else. I would prefer not to say as to Iran,
because I am not too sure that has too much application in our case.
There is a danger, of course, of the Russians moving into Iran and starting another aggression. Whether or not that is any more dangerous than Yugoslavia or Indochina or some other place, I am not prepared to state; but certainly it is
a point of danger and we would like to be in a better position to meet any further aggression, if it occurred.
Senator BREWSTER: The modification of our objective in Korea from the original objective of clearing Korea of aggression to the more moderate one of accepting some solution along the thirty-eighth parallel is modified not only by
military considerations, but also by the general world picture. If we should be required to move forces into Iran to support the British moves there, would we not be compelled to call on some of our rather limited reserves?
General BRADLEY: Well, can I answer that in a general way, not confining it to Iran?
Senator BREWSTER: Yes.
General BRADLEY: I think that is true, that we would be better off if we could get through the situation in Korea and be in a better position to meet any movement anywhere else in the world. I think that is fully understandable.
I would like to explain also that my answer here about being satisfied with something less than complete clearance of Korea is merely my own answer here. That is not a United Nations answer.
Senator BREWSTER: I understand.
General BRADLEY: You understand that what we finally do is a political decision and must be reached by the United Nations and by ourselves based upon the situation as it exists in Korea; and my answer of accepting something less
than that certainly doesn’t commit our Government to that. That is my own opinion as brought out here in this committee.
DANGER OF AGGRESSION IN IRAN AND ELSEWHERE
Senator WILEY: [Alexander Wiley, Rep.-WI] I note, General Bradley, that you stated yesterday but you did not seem to feel very sure as to whether or not the Iranian situation was actually
more critical than, let us say, the possibility of satellite invasion of Yugoslavia. The British seem to regard the Iranian situation as infinitely more important.
According to reports, they may be ready to use parachute troops in order to prevent oil fields from falling into unfriendly hands. I wonder therefore how you would square your comments which seem to understate the case as against the
reports of Great Britain which seem to point up the tremendous dangers there involved.
General BRADLEY: There have been many places in which there has been a threatened aggression or threatened trouble in the last 6 months. Yugoslavia for example was very much in the limelight here 2 or 3 months ago and it is still
a danger point.
Iran has always been one and right now it is in the limelight because of the dispute over oil between Great Britain and the Government of Iran. So far as I am concerned, I think from a British point of view probably they look upon this
as the most dangerous point right now. As far as I am concerned, I am not too sure the Russians are going to start something in Iran before they start it somewhere else, and that as the basis of my statement yesterday.
Senator WILEY: Have there been any joint Anglo-American discussions relative to military intervention in Iran?
General BRADLEY: Military?
Senator WILEY: Yes.
General BRADLEY: There have been no military discussions, no. I don’t know whether or not anybody else has had any.
Senator WILEY: My next question has to do with the military power of the Tudeh, the outlawed Iranian Communist Party. I was wondering if you have any information as to the ability of that party to put strong military forces, that
is either regular or irregular military forces, into the field in the event trouble came.
General BRADLEY: I don’t have that information at hand right now. There are a lot of sources of trouble in Iran. That would be one of them.
Some of the tribesmen up on the Soviet border are probably more it to cause trouble than this party, and I don’t think anyone would know — combinations of the various parties if the Communists really started some outbreak in Iran.
AVAILABILITY OF FORCES IN NEAR EAST
Senator WILEY: All right. Turning now to the present world situation, because I think there is one statement you made today to the effect that MacArthur looked at the matter simply from the stand-point of the Far East and not
from the scope of the world. I wonder if you would tell us whether—compatible with military security—the United States has any military forces it could utilize in the Near East, for example, in Iran, in the event trouble were
to break out there.
General COLLINS: [Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army] We have forces. The question as to whether we should use them there or not is a different story.
• [Transcribed and annotated by Arash Norouzi]
Related links:
The MacArthur Doctrine and Persia | Calgary Herald, May 22, 1951
Mossadegh Tells Soviets To Evacuate Iran | March 3, 1946 Speech
Maj. George Fielding Eliot on Iran Oil Crisis (May 26, 1951)
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
