It would be unwise to build very much optimism on the possibility of peace in Korea, for the situation in Iran could well become more serious than that in Korea ever was. Russia can well afford to concede peace in Korea, for she is on the verge of a greater victory — at least a greater struggle — in Iran.

What went wrong? Where was the mistake?

At the moment Britain is taking the only tenable and honorable course. She cannot submit to the blackjack tactics of the Iranian government. In the face of the new anti-sabotage laws she must withdraw all her citizens. She can’t leave them at the mercy of a tyranny like that.

But to what extent is the Mossadegh regime to blame? It has been said by trained observers, and passed on in this column as gospel, that the small Mossadegh party is not pro-Russian, is the most honest faction in Iran and has the best of motives — improving the welfare of the Iranian people. It is motivated by a fanatic nationalism, and by a measure of pride and conceit that the facts do not warrant. But Iran is not a well-knit political structure. Actually the government has not too much influence. Assassins, secret societies and mobs are in actual control, and they could unseat Mossadegh whenever they chose. That doesn’t excuse him, of course, but it might explain his attitude.

Could anything have done in the past to forestall the oil nationalization sentiment? Perhaps. But that is all ancient history now. There is no doubt a lesson in it for other countries, but as for Iran there seems no hope. Iranian oil seems lost to Britain and the democracies. The main question now is whether the end result will be even worse.