The crisis in Iran, like, the war in Korea, is a problem to which no easy answer is apparent.

The real danger is not much the loss of Iranian oil (serious as that would be, for the Iranian output is 13 per cent of the total world production of petroleum outside the United States) as it is the possibility that out of the present chaos and anarchy might come an opportunity for the Tudeh (Communist) Party to seize power in Iran. That would mean a new Soviet satellite—it would mean tremendous succession of power—it would advance the Soviet frontier to the Persian and the waters of the Indian Ocean—it would start a chain reaction which would probably end in in the loss of all Middle Eastern oil to the western world, a disaster of the first magnitude.

We should never forget that on November 26, 1940, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov officially informed the Nazi Ambassador at Moscow that the price of Soviet collaboration with the Axis Powers would include German assent to the proposition that area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf (i.e., Iran) is recognized as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union.” This Soviet objective has never since been disavowed; indeed, it been pursued at every opportunity. It is still being pursued.

What is to be done?

There are several possibilities.

Negotiation and compromise with the existing government are not among those possibilities, for from all accounts the mere mention of either of those pleasant words by any Iranian politician means assassination. The spectacle of the Iranian Prime Minister cowering behind Parliament boarded windows in in the building is a sufficient commentary on his ability to do any negotiating. The political situation in Teheran at the moment was aptly described by returning traveler as “co-ordinated lunacy and organized homicidal mania” — with the Communists whooping it on and waiting, poised, for the moment to barge in and take over.

The one stable political element in Teheran itself is the authority of the Shah. He still has some authority and he is a man of common sense.

So far he has bowed to the storm. But if he wanted to he probably could act effectively. He has the loyalty of the Army and of Gendarmerie. These are controlled, respectively by General Nagdhi, the Minister of War, and General Zahedi, of the Minister of the Interior. Both are tough men, as Iranian generals go, and would undoubtedly obey the Shah’s orders. [Ali-Asghar Naghdi, Fazlollah Zahedi]

But to be effective, those orders would have to include immediate dissolution of the Majlis (Parliament), dismissal of the government, sweeping arrests of both Nationalist and Communist leaders, and declaration of martial law. The risk would be that such a series of acts might touch off a revolution with both Moslem fanatics and the Communists helping to throw the country into chaos.

There is no hint in any reports from Teheran that the Shah is prepared to face this—but then there would be no such hints in advance, since if the Shah decided to act his one hope would be to make his coup a complete surprise.

Moreover, it would be essential to have the support of the great tribes of Southern and central Iran, and for that support the tribal leaders would exact a stiff price in the concessions. Negotiation on this head may be one reason the Shah has delayed taking action.

Short of such drastic action by the Shah, opening the way—if successful—to the resumption of the oil negotiations on a reasonable basis, what are the other possibilities?

One of them is that the country falls into anarchy by reason of the inability of the central government to govern. In that case there would probably be nothing for the British government to do but to send in troops to protect the lives of its 2,500 nationals in the oil-field area—unless some local arrangement could be made with tribal leaders which would maintain order in that area, and that is less likely than it might have been a few years ago, since the British have not maintained the friendly contacts which they then had with the tribal chiefs.

Another possibility is the emergence of a Communist government from the present chaos, which again would probably make it imperative for the British to use troops, though in this case the tribes would be more likely to take a cooperative attitude as their leaders are strongly anti-Communist, though certainly also strongly anti-British at the present time.

Behind this general review of a few of the things that may happen in Iran, it is impossible for objective comment to go right now.

The main point for Americans to keep in mind is that we have in Iran, as in Korea: another power-move by our enemies in the Kremlin, not just a row tween a British oil company and the government of an Asiatic state. Neither Washington nor London wants to take the risk of using force, but if the choice is between using force and seeing Russian tanks on the shore of the Persian Gulf, then the risk must be weighed in the same balance as was the risk we took when we marched into Korea to prevent a Soviet advance to the sea borders of Japan or when we went into Greece to keep Soviet power out of the Eastern Mediterranean.