WASHINGTON, Sept. 20—Iran’s threat to make an oil deal with Stalin will not change the British and American attitude. [There was never any deal, or threat to make a deal, with the Soviet Union or Premier Joseph Stalin] Washington agrees with London that there should be a negotiated settlement of the dispute over the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil interests, and will continue to press for a peaceful compromise.

The Teheran government’s announcement that it is ready to sign a barter pact with Russia for disposal of oil to Stalin and his satellites tends to stiffen British and American policies, rather than to weaken them as desired by Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh.

Although British and American policies are similar in opposing one-way action by Iran and any Soviet intervention, reports that Washington is giving London blank-check support are inaccurate. There are significant differences between the two.

Political Analysis

ONE difference is over political analysis. The British have thought all along that the Mossadegh extreme nationalist regime would fall without support of oil revenues and British trade preferences, and would be followed by a more conservative government.

Washington fears that the present Teheran cabinet, if forced out, might be succeeded by chaos or communism or both. Hence, the hope here that Premier Mossadegh will cease flirting with Stalin and issuing ultimata to London, and resume constructive negotiations with the British. Another difference is over method. [Mossadegh was “flirting” with America, not Russia]

The British Labor government, under pressure of the Tory Party in Parliament, has indicated it will use force to protect 350 British technicians left at the Abadan refinery for standby purposes. Washington opposes use of British force except under extreme provocation, on the ground this would play into the hands of Iranian fanatics and invite Soviet intervention.

So far London has gone along with Washington’s judgment, both in offering a favorable compromise in the recent Mossadegh negotiations and in refraining from the use of force. But if Mossadegh tries to expell [sic] the Abadan technicians in 15 days, as threatened, London may get tough.

Not Taken Seriously

APART from the danger of Russian military intervention in case of violence at Abadan, a Teheran-Moscow trade pact to solve the Iranian oil problem is not taken too seriously here or in London. Even if Iranian-Russian technicians could run the oil fields, it is doubted that they could operate Abadan refinery or transport much of the product abroad.

The State Department made public today the recent exchange between Premier Mossadegh and Presidential Assistant W. Averell Harriman, in which the latter refused to transmit to Britain the 15-day Iranian ultimatum.

Position Reaffirmed

MR. HARRIMAN said the new Mossadegh offer was less than the earlier one which was unacceptable. While renewing his proposal to mediate on any practical basis, and stating that a just compromise is possible, Mr. Harriman reaffirmed the American position as follows:

“The seizure by any government of foreign owned assets without either prompt, adequate and effective compensation or alternative arrangements satisfactory to the former owners is, regardless of the intent, confiscation rather than nationalization.”