“A” IRAN. Tudeh Sends Open Letter to Prime Minister Mossadeq. The outlawed pro-Soviet Tudeh Party has sent an open letter to the Prime Minister, according to the US press, demanding the following: (1) Legalization of the party, (2) Expulsion of the US Military Mission to Iran, (3) Rejection of foreign arms aid, (4) Release of political prisoners, (5) Recognition of Communist China, (6) End to martial law in the oil fields, and (7) nationalization of the Bahrein Island oil fields. [excised area here]

COMMENT: The Tudeh Party was banned in February 1949 following an assassination attempt on the Shah in which it was implicated. Since that time it has contined [sic] its activities clandestinely. The Tudeh letter puts Mossadeq in a difficult position, for he is an advocate of the free expression of political beliefs and many of the points in the letter are not in conflict with his own stand. He is rumored to be considering legalizing the Tudeh on the grounds that it might be easier to control if its activities were brought out into the open. Nevertheless the Tudeh has attacked him, and now that he has become Prime Minister he may be inclined to consider the Tudeh too dangerous to be permitted to express itself openly and freely.

“B” IRAN. US Ambassador’s Estimate of Mossadeq’s Strategy. The US Ambassador in Tehran [Henry Grady] on 7 May made the following appraisal of Prime Minister Mossadeq’s strategy and program: (1) Mossadeq will concentrate on a solution of the oil issue and will not push such projects as electoral and budget reforms if opposition to them develops in Parliament (Majlis). He will avoid friction with the Majlis, (2) Selection of members of the proposed joint Oil Commission will probably occur promptly and will be controlled largely by Mossadeq, (3) Once the Commission is formed, Mossadeq will probably move cautiously, particularly since he seems to have as yet no clear idea as to how he will proceed, (4) Mossadeq’s policy as outlined may succeed for some three months, or until the Oil Commission submits its settlement proposals to the Majlis, at which time Mossadeq will have to assume responsibility. The US Ambassador concluded that Mossadeq’s precarious health, or popular, possibly Tudeh-stimulated, impatience over the delays might hasten a showdown for Mossadeq.

[excised area here] COMMENT: While Mossadeq stands to retain Majlis support on the oil issue as long as popular feeling on the problem continues at its present high level, it is difficult to see how he can avoid friction with the Majlis. Mossadeq’s National Front has wide popular appeal in many of its issues, but it has few representatives in the Majlis and the old line non-Party politicians in Mossadeq’s cabinet are not likely to support issues opposed to their own interests. Unless Mossadeq can obtain popular support for other measures equal to that which he has on oil nationalization, it is doubtful that he can remain in power for long. At the moment, it seems unlikely that he will do so.