1. At the Deputies’ meeting expressed to the Director [Walter Bedell Smith] that after study of the cables from Iran I had concluded that Mossadeq was “crazy like a fox.” I disagree with reports indicating that there was any real possibility of settling the situation through action by the Shah or a military coup at this time. It seemed to me that the National Front was the only organization capable of controlling the situation in Iran and even in his most recent statements Mossadeq had indicated a willingness to deal directly with the U.S. The Director indicated that he was in agreement with these views, but we concluded generally that they had been covered in the various O/NE memoranda which we had disseminated. I later expressed the same views to Sherman Kent [pioneering CIA official, former O.S.S. and Yale history professor] and left it to his discretion as to whether or not O/NE could profitably make a further contribution in this situation. [ONE = Office of National Estimates]